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The fact that Taiwan set up an institution solely dedicated to transitional 
justice only thirty years after the country’s democratization has made 
Taiwan’s transitional justice experience unique among newly democratized 
states. How and when transitional justice is approached and upheld will affect 
a country’s stance toward its dark history and even re-make its democracy. 
Taiwan is currently heralding a new experience that is determining for 
Taiwan’s democratic future and that could serve as a valuable reference for 
other countries that are to go through or are in the middle of democratization. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the years when Taiwan’s authoritarian rule was coming to an end, 
political victims and civic organizations started to demand that the 
government face up to its past wrongs and redress historical injustices. Before 
2016, there was no shortage of apologies made by the president (of both major 
parties when they held the executive branch) and compensations offered to 
political victims and their families in response to their demands. However, 
legislation addressing past human rights violations passed before 2016 was 
limited in scope and conservative in language, as Caldwell rightly 
argues, 1 while cases of political persecution were said to be caused by 
misjudgments or flaws in the administrative process, rather than the 
systematic product of a repressive state. In 2017, after the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) won both the presidency and the legislature for the 
first time in Taiwan’s democratic history in 2016, the Act on Promoting 
Transitional Justice (hereafter, Transitional Justice Act) cleared the floor in 
the Legislative Yuan. 
 
†  Hung-Ling Yeh is the Commissioner of the Transitional Justice Commission of Taiwan. Ching-
Hsuan Su is a Research Fellow for the Transitional Justice Commission of Taiwan. The authors would like 
to thank Alison Hsiao, Lin-Hsuan Huang, Yen-Peng Lu, and Yi Kao for their assistance, suggestions, and 
helpful comments.  
1  See Ernest Caldwell, Transitional Justice Legislation in Taiwan Before and During the Tsai 
Administration, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 465–67 (2018). 
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Caldwell characterized Taiwan’s transitional justice as having 
developed in two phases, with the first period running from 1987 to 2016 and 
the second starting from the DPP’s securing of both the presidency and the 
legislative majority in 2016.2 Due to time constraints, he was not able to take 
his observations further and said it remained to be seen how the Transitional 
Justice Commission (“TJC” or “the Commission”), established in accordance 
with the Transitional Justice Act in May 2018, would work to fill the “gaps of 
knowledge and accountability” left unfilled and unresolved from the first 
phase.3 The aim of this article is to answer this question, which has also been 
raised by the victims, Taiwanese society, and international human rights 
academics. The main tasks of the TJC will be laid out, followed by a 
presentation of the approach that the TJC has taken for the redressing of past 
judicial wrongs, one of the key indicators of the progress of Taiwan’s 
transitional justice. 
II. THE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE COMMISSION 
The work of transitional justice was dispersed among various 
government agencies before the establishment of the TJC. The National 
Human Rights Museum, which is founded upon and transformed from former 
White Terror prison compounds in Jingmei, New Taipei City, and on Green 
Island, Taitung County, is administered by the Ministry of Culture, while the 
National Development Council is the agency that supervises the collection 
and management of the political archives. The National Human Rights 
Museum and the National Development Council are both third-tier 
government bodies. Overseeing the maintenance of statues of Chiang Kai-
shek that abound around the island, on the other hand, falls under the authority 
of either municipal governments or schools. 
On the compensation offered to victims, both February 28 Incident 
victims and White Terror victims have been financially compensated by the 
government. Taiwan has already issued a total of more than 26 billion NT 
dollars (840 million U.S. dollars) of compensation to its political victims. 
Notwithstanding this achievement, the demand for truth and ending impunity 
had nevertheless gone unanswered. Corresponding agencies for the planning 
and execution of tasks such as redressing past judicial injustice and holding 
perpetrators accountable had been non-existent before the TJC. The 
imperative work of transitional justice, including excavating and restoring 
 
2  Id. at 451–52. 
3  Id. at 480–83. 
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historical truth, reinstituting justice, and compensating the victims, had been 
lacking in systematicity and consistency, which was why the TJC had to be 
established.  
The TJC is an independent, second-tier government agency overseen 
by the Executive Yuan, consisting of nine commission members, five of 
whom are full-time while the rest are part-time. The commission members, as 
stipulated by the Transitional Justice Act, are nominated by the Premier and 
subject to legislative review and confirmation. The commission includes a 
maximum of three members from the same political party and no fewer than 
three members from each gender. With its nominees confirmed in May 2018, 
the TJC was officially founded at the end of the same month, with a 
semiannual budget of 1.7 million U.S. dollars (from June to December 2018) 
and a staff of about seventy people. Within two years, the Transitional Justice 
Act stipulates, the TJC shall “submit a hardcopy mission conclusion report to 
the Premier” regarding the tasks it has been assigned.4 “If the Commission is 
unable to complete its work within two years, it may report to the Premier and 
request an extension; each extension shall be no longer than one year,” the 
law states.5 
As an independent administrative institution, “the TJC shall exercise its 
authorities of office independently in accordance with the law” and its 
members “shall exercise their authorities of office in an independent and non-
partisan manner, and shall not take part in the activities of any political party 
during their terms,” according to the Transitional Justice Act.6 In practice, 
there are currently two commission members with DPP party membership in 
the commission. Furthermore, the fact that the commission is a second-level 
government agency has guaranteed a considerable amount of power for the 
commission to coordinate between government agencies of different levels 
and to hold a comprehensive view of its plan. 
The TJC consists of four departments for the end of accomplishing the 
tasks assigned by the provisions of the Transitional Justice Act. First, the 
Department of Historical Truth Restoration is tasked to investigate, on the 
basis of the political archives and statements made by concerned parties, the 
repressive institutions consolidated by the Temporary Provisions Effective 
 
4  See Cujin Zhuanxing Zhengyi Tiaolo (促進轉型正義條例) [Act on Promoting Transitional Justice], 
art. 11 (Dec. 27, 2017), https://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCODE=A0030296. 
5  Id. 
6  Id. art. 12. 
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During the Period of Communist Rebellion and the human rights violations 
committed under them. The results of the investigations will help the 
commission determine the source of human rights abuses, identify the 
perpetrators and participants in the oppression mechanisms and thereby assign 
accountability. The department is also to establish a database by integrating 
resources from existing archives of past court-martial trials, in which the 
perpetrators and those who had been involved in the repression and how 
human rights were violated will be made public. The database, when 
completed, will provide in-depth and insightful information on Taiwan’s past 
authoritarian model. 
The Department of Authoritarian Relics Handling, the second 
department, is tasked with inspecting the number and locations of the statues 
or memorials commemorating authoritarian rulers Chiang Kai-shek and 
Chiang Ching-kuo. The department will explain to the public why the 
commemoration contradicts the democratic constitutional order and work to 
remove the authoritarian symbols on the basis of social consensus. Locating 
historical sites where victims used to be imprisoned, detained, tortured, and 
interrogated is also one of the department’s missions. The TJC will later 
determine whether the sites are to be turned into memorials or tourist spots 
incorporating local culture. Handling authoritarian relics, which includes 
erasing symbols that are nostalgic or in memorial of the authoritarian ruler(s) 
in public buildings and spaces and preserving the sites of past injustice for 
educational purposes, will prevent and caution the future generations against 
the rise and return of authoritarianism. 
The third department, the Department of Redressing Past Judicial 
Wrongs, is to dissolve the legality of the past authoritarian rule and to reinstate 
the victims’ reputation. The department reviews the political verdicts to 
identify the victims before expunging their records of punishment and 
confiscation and making an official and public announcement of the 
expungement. The department is able to do so because the victims’ 
convictions have been annulled since December 27, 2018, the date on which 
Transitional Justice Act was promulgated. The legislative revocation (of 
convictions) and how confiscated properties could be returned or 
compensated will be further discussed in the next section where Taiwan’s 
approach to redressing past judicial wrongs is explained. The department is 
also trying to formulate a mechanism for the purification of the personnel 
system, also known as lustration law in Eastern Europe, and setting up a 
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method for the restitution of properties illegally acquired by the government, 
individuals, or institutions during the period of authoritarian rule. 
The Department of Rebuilding Social Trust works on addressing 
psychological traumas and also on planning the use of the ill-gotten party 
assets to promote and assist in transitional justice, human rights education, 
long-term care and other social welfare policies, and other transitional justice-
related cultural projects. The department has also started to train voluntary 
counseling psychologists to help the TJC deal with the psychological traumas 
caused by past political violence. 
The two-year term TJC, at the end of its mission, will publish a final 
report, on the basis of the work of the four departments—namely, collected 
statements, investigative findings, archival materials, and the commission’s 
efforts made to prevent the rise of authoritarian nostalgia and address 
psychological traumas caused by past political violence. The final report will 
reveal how human rights were violated during the February 28 Incident and 
the White Terror Period by the repressive institutions for the “mobilization for 
the suppression of the communist rebellion” and under martial law. 
Redressing judicial wrongs is one of the most important among the 
TJC’s various tasks. However, of all the authoritarian legacies in Taiwan that 
remain to be dealt with, judicial wrongs have been one of, and perhaps even 
the most, thorny authoritarian leftovers when efforts were made to settle them 
within the bureaucracy. One of the main characteristics of Taiwan’s 
authoritarian rule was systematic human rights violations through military 
trials; on the face of it, the military trials were conducted in accordance with 
the “law,” but the legitimacy of the laws and the judgments has since been 
called into question by today’s standard.  
III. REDRESSING THE JUDICIAL WRONGS 
The lifting of martial law in 1987 has often been regarded as the 
beginning of Taiwan’s democratization process, followed by the abolition of 
the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist 
Rebellion in 1991 and the amendment to Article 100 of the Criminal Code 
(which criminalized seditious “intentions”) in 1992. Since then, subversive 
intentions and speech could no longer be criminally punished, which signified 
the dawn of a new democratic period. 
614 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  VOL. 28 NO. 3 
However, following these moves, the then-ruling Kuomintang (“KMT”) 
government failed to initiate the transitional justice project as other new 
democracies had done. Not only did it fail to do so, the KMT government 
further took advantage of its remaining authority to pass the National Security 
Act  as “supporting measures” to the lifting of martial law that effectively 
precluded civilians tried under martial law from appealing their convictions 
in civil court in the post-martial law period, which is a right guaranteed by the 
Martial Law Act. 
  Legal scholar Tay-Sheng Wang argued that passing the National 
Security Act reflected “the KMT government’s full respect for the formal 
legality of the courts-martial trials, which sanctioned state inaction regarding 
possible past injustice, and its explicit denial of transitional justice.”7 The 
constitutionality of the legislation was later further confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 272 in 1991, citing 
“the maintaining of stability and consistency of the judicial process and of the 
social order” as imperative and thereby, Wang argued, “tacitly validated and 
legitimated the human rights abuses perpetrated by the KMT officials during 
the martial law period.”8 
  The interpretation had two following implications. First, by upholding 
the importance of “the maintaining of stability and consistency of the judicial 
process and of the social order,” the Court’s interpretation placed a major 
barrier to the victims’ recourse to justice. Second, as those cases cannot be 
appealed in civil court for reconsideration in the post-democratization time, 
investigating the legality (or the absence of it) of the court-martial trials was 
practically out of the question. 
  The Transitional Justice Act was passed by the legislature at the end of 
2017. Article 6 of the act directly addresses the redressing of past judicial 
wrongs and upends the conservative mentality and measures depicted in the 
preceding paragraphs. 
  Article 6(3) of the Transitional Justice Act stipulates that those victims 
who have been compensated or have had their rights re-instituted in 
accordance with the February 28 Incident Disposition and Compensation Act 
(1995), the Compensation Act for Wrongful Trials on Charges of Sedition and 
 
7  See Tay-Sheng Wang, Transitional Justice in Taiwan: A Dialogue among the Past, the Present and 
the Future, 315 TAIWAN L.J. 1 (2017). 
8  See Judicial Yuan [J.Y.] Interpretation No. 272, DAFAGUAN JIESHI [JIESHI] (Const. Ct. Jan. 18, 1980), 
https://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03_01.asp?expno=272; Caldwell, supra note 1, at 462. 
July 2019        Never Too Late—The Work of the TJC in Taiwan  615 
 
 
Espionage during the Martial Law Period (1998), and the Act Governing the 
Recovery of Damage of Individual Rights during the Period of Martial Law 
(1995/2000), shall see the related convictions voided and their criminal 
records expunged from the date on which the Act entered into force 
(December 27, 2017). And for those who did not meet the above descriptions, 
including those who had been ruled guilty of taking part in subversive 
activities and therefore denied compensation, the TJC—acting ex officio or 
upon application by the concerned party—will be able to review their criminal 
convictions, which, if determined to be judicial wrongs, are also to be annulled 
and expunged from the record. As to how the confiscated properties are to be 
returned to the victims following the expunging of the record of confiscation, 
the TJC is now estimating the amount and value and sorting out the categories 
(e.g., lots of land, buildings, or cash) of the properties confiscated. Regular 
meetings with experts and professionals are conducted to discuss possible 
future measures.   
  There are reasons why the Transitional Justice Act, legislated only 
thirty years after democratization, has chosen to remedy the judicial injustice 
by means of direct legislative revocation instead of going through the judicial 
system for re-trials. As the country’s political victims are dying off, the 
judicial process initiated by individual victims, which might drag on for years, 
would be an impractical approach for the septuagenarians and octogenarians 
to attain their rightful justice. Also, for historical cases like these, the 
preservation and acquisition of intact evidence is unlikely, a fact that might 
not facilitate the victims’ winning the case in court even if they appeal. Finally, 
transitional justice has never been carried out in Taiwan’s judicial system, 
which has not been reformed since the authoritarian period. As the court is 
itself a target of the transitional justice project, it is doubtful that it would be 
able to shoulder the arduous task and political responsibility of re-interpreting 
the legal order.9 
  Since the establishment of the TJC on May 31, 2018, the Commission 
has invested considerable resources in order to restore the justice of the 
victims as fast as possible. After reviewing and conducting a comparative 
check on the documents from various government agencies, the TJC 
announced on October 5, 2018, the first list of a total of 1,270 victims whose 
convictions were to be revoked. The list was published in the official 
Executive Yuan Gazette and on the official website of the TJC. 
 
9  Wang, supra note 7. 
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  The TJC also held a grand announcement ceremony for announcing the 
list on the same day. The ceremony was held in the five-star Sheraton Grand 
Taipei Hotel in Taipei, where the most notorious detention center in the 1950s 
used to sit. More than 200 political victims and their families were present at 
the ceremony, the most senior of whom is 98 years old, a survivor of and 
partaker in the February 28 Uprising in 1947. President Tsai Ing-wen, along 
with Premier Lai Ching-deok of the Executive Yuan, Legislative Speaker Su 
Chia-chyuan, and Control Yuan President Chang Po-ya, attended the 
ceremony. 
  Three representatives of the victims making remarks during the 
ceremony stressed that the TJC’s task of annulling their convictions was 
“immensely meaningful” for them. President Tsai Ing-wen again apologized 
to the victims at the ceremony, acknowledging that the revocation came too 
late for all of the victims to see their convictions voided. 
  However, concerning the said progress made by the TJC, two 
subsequent issues are worthy of our attention. The first is the cost of opting 
for legislative revocation of the convictions: skipping the judicial process that 
entails re-investigation is simple and fast, but the price is that truth is then 
hard to come by. The other difficulty is the question of how the TJC 
investigates those cases that had failed to receive compensation or 
reinstitution of rights, and at the same time establishes the legitimacy and 
authority of its decisions. 
  The risk of sacrificing the truth for early justice, in the absence of other 
means within the existing system, could be offset and compensated by making 
more political archives public—another of TJC’s major tasks—and 
encouraging more research into them. As for the second difficulty, while the 
TJC is far from on a par with the court in terms of legal expertise and 
procedural soundness, it has convened a review team consisting of 
professionals from academia and the field of legal practice to conduct the 
necessary investigations. The TJC is expecting that the legal professionals will 
substantiate the decisions made by the Commission with solid arguments to 
enhance their legitimacy. 
  The work of redressing past judicial wrongs, we believe, would help 
wean Taiwan from the tendency to infringe upon human rights in the name of 
state security. In a time when the world is witnessing serious democratic 
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backsliding, Taiwan’s hard-earned democracy can be a valuable example and 
model. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Taiwan’s stable and vibrant democracy is unique in Asia. How its 
transitional justice effort has transitioned and developed from the early post-
democratization period to what it is now might also provide a unique 
perspective to the existing related research and practice. 
  For Taiwan (and possibly many other Asian countries as well), the 
terminology of “transitional justice” might have been imported, but the 
concept of compensating the victims and disclosing historical truth, among 
various other related objectives, in order to redress the past wrongs, is native 
and has long been promoted by the Taiwanese civil society and victim groups 
since as early as the 1990s, when the country was just embarking on the 
democratization process. 
  Today, with the support from society, the TJC has been established to 
carry out the work of transitional justice more systematically, such as 
redressing past judicial wrongs and assigning responsibility and 
accountability for human rights violations. Although with the current 
approach, the challenges and difficulties described earlier might arise, we are 
confident in our ability to learn lessons from other countries’ precedents, and 
expect that our experience could also be an example for other societies with 
Chinese culture background or newly democratized states in the future. We 
believe that this is the best gift that a small country like Taiwan can offer to 
the democratic world. 
  
618 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  VOL. 28 NO. 3 
 
